Alton Towers Discussion Thread

[Guy T. Koepp]

If it bleeds! It leads!

[DILinator]

If it bleeds! It leads!

 

Having worked firsthand on the TV Production crew at a local News broadcast, I have heard that very statement from the News Director, and have witnessed his actual glee when bad, or even terrible events happen to report on. Yeah, it's messed up, but it definitely is true, unfortunately...

[Garet]

Alton Towers sentencing: 'Operator Merlin at fault'

 

Human error caused two carriages to collide in June 2015, leaving five people seriously injured

Alton Towers operator Merlin was at fault for the Smiler rollercoaster crash, a court has heard.

Two teenagers were left needing leg amputations and several other victims suffered serious injuries in the accident in June 2015.

An investigation found human error caused the crash, which saw a carriage smash into an empty car.

Operator Merlin Attractions has been warned to expect a "very large fine" for health and safety breaches.

 

Opening the sentencing hearing at Stafford Crown Court, barrister Bernard Thorogood, prosecuting for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), said the crash equated to "a family car of 1.5 tons having collided at about 90mph".

•The £18m Smiler was the world's first 14 multi-loop rollercoaster with up to five trains running at any one time

•On 2 June four trains were operating on the ride; a fifth was stored away

•At 13:00 BST there was a problem with one of the trains; technical staff were called

•One of the engineers thought it was a good opportunity to add the fifth train because the park was busy

•An empty test train was sent but failed

•Engineers pushed the train until it engaged with the system and off it went

•Another empty train was sent out. It got stuck, too, but in a different place

•Engineers were unaware of this, thought everything was working fine and handed it back to operators

•The train with 16 passengers on was sent out and stopped

•The engineers looked but could not see the stalled car, thought the computer was wrong, and over-rode the stop. This set the 16-passenger train in motion and into the empty carriage

He said a test carriage had been sent around the 14-loop ride but had failed.

'Fault with employers'

Engineers re-set the ride and overrode a computer system "block-stop" which they believed had halted the ride in error, sending a full 16-seater rollercoaster car around the track and into the empty carriage.

Mr Thorogood said that the "fault here is with the employers", not individuals.

He said the engineers were "without guidance from above", and had not been given a system to follow to safely deal with the problem on the track.

"The fault is with the defendant for not devising a scheme, for not guiding the work of the engineers," he said.

Among those who attended the first day were Victoria Balch and Leah Washington, who had legs amputated after the crash.

Wind speeds

The court heard how there were estimated winds on the day of 45mph. But the manufacturer's manual said the ride should not be operated at speeds above 34 mph.

Mr Thorogood said the victims were left for a "significant period of time" at least 20ft (6m) above ground, waiting for medical attention because of the inaccessibility of the ride.

 

Daniel Thorpe, Vicky Balch, Joe Pugh and Leah Washington were among those who suffered the most serious injuries

He said engineers on the day had not read or seen the operating instructions for the ride.

The Recorder of Stafford, Judge Michael Chambers QC, is set to hear mitigation from Merlin, based in Poole, Dorset, before passing sentence.

In April the operator admitted charges of breaching the Health and Safety Act. An investigation by the park found staff misunderstood a shutdown message and wrongly restarted the ride.

Since the crash, a number of safety changes have been made including improved access and a policy of closing the ride when winds exceed 35mph.

Source

[Henry M]

A video of the collision has been shown from CCTV:

 

https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2016/sep/26/alton-towers-smiler-crash-was-like-car-crashing-at-90mph

[SixFlagsAstroworld]

A video of the collision has been shown from CCTV:

 

https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2016/sep/26/alton-towers-smiler-crash-was-like-car-crashing-at-90mph

 

Ouch. That looks SUPER painful

[gerstlaueringvar]

It's good to get to know what exactly happened. And holy hell that looks like a painful crash! I'm impressed by the Gerstlauer train engineering team that the whole train didn't fall apart. It could've been way worse.

[Lindis]

http://www.altontowers.com/useful-info/opening-times/

Does anyone know why Alton Towers is closed Tues 27th and Weds 28th September?

Is it anything to do with the court hearing?

[Dar]

They've been closed on mid-week days most of the season, it's to save money.

[Lindis]

Ah thanks for the update.

Sorry I didnt know that. For several reasons I have not made the trip up there this year sadly.

As far as I know, they have never had closed days before in previous years, if this is all down to falling numbers following the Smiler incident, then it must have shaken peoples oppinion more than I thought.

[SharkTums]

So the machine was smarter than the humans, the humans didn't believe it, overpowered the machine, and nearly killed innocent humans. Bring on Judgement Day!

[SixFlagsAstroworld]

So the machine was smarter than the humans, the humans didn't believe it, overpowered the machine, and nearly killed innocent humans. Bring on Judgement Day!

[Dar]

Merlin have been fined £5 million.

[Garet]

I always assumed there was no footage of the actual impact of the crash apart from that phone footage because it was a blind spot and that cameras came after the accident so that footage is quite surprising considering this:

 

•The engineers looked but could not see the stalled car, thought the computer was wrong, and over-rode the stop. This set the 16-passenger train in motion and into the empty carriage

 

You'd think the cameras would be one of the first things used outside of actually looking.

[mr.sugar]

I thought the same. But... When I watched it myself, I didn´t see the valley-ed train as well. The quality is quite bad and it blends with the track and the rest of the environment quite well, especially when it´s standstill.

 

I only saw the train for the second glimplse and only because:

 

1) I knew there must be the damned train somewhere

2) I approximately knew where to look for it.

 

If I were the operator, I wouldn´t probably see that...

[A.J.]

Yes, but I don't think that the operators and engineers can just make assumptions like that. They have to know exactly how many trains are on the track and where they are at all times. I feel like if there's even any doubt, the coaster should go to full stop on all appropriate block sections until every train is accounted for.

[coasterbill]

If I were the operator, I wouldn´t probably see that...

 

Sorry, as a ride op / maintenance person you need to know how many ride units are on the ride. If you don't know where they all are before starting the ride after it just block stopped then you're an a**hole.

[Henry M]

I thought the same. But... When I watched it myself, I didn´t see the valley-ed train as well. The quality is quite bad and it blends with the track and the rest of the environment quite well, especially when it´s standstill.

 

I only saw the train for the second glimplse and only because:

 

1) I knew there must be the damned train somewhere

2) I approximately knew where to look for it.

 

If I were the operator, I wouldn´t probably see that...

The train does bland in well, and when there are 20+ cameras to look at, there is an issue.

[coasterbill]

Forget the cameras. As a ride operator / maintenance staff member you need to know how many ride units are on the track. If you don't see one of them then figure out where it is. This is pretty simple sh*t.

Edited September 28, 2016 by coasterbill

[mr.sugar]

Forget the cameras. As a ride operator / maintenance staff member you need to know how many ride units are on the track. If you don't see one of them then figure out where it is.

 

No doubts, that was mistake on his part. Just saying it wasn´t obvious from cameras. Then it´s hard to say, whatever he didn´t realize there is actually one more train (maybe he was still thinking there is 4, not 5).. He could thought this just for a split second, forgetting the extra train, and press the button. I can imagine such a stupid mistake can happen.

[Dar]

There's a .zip folder at the bottom of this page http://press.hse.gov.uk/2016/alton-towers-owners-fined-over-smiler-crash/ that contains the CCTV footage and the expert witness report that details exactly what went wrong and why. Warning, it's 250 pages of the driest reading you've ever seen unless you do this for a living! Unfortunately it's been redacted to remove statements, names and other identifiable/confidential information. So appendices 1 and 2 are blank.

 

If you watch the CCTV, you can see that the empty train was stuck at the top of the batwing for 20 seconds before rolling back into the valley. It's crazy to think that if the wind had been blowing in the opposite direction that day, none of this would have ever happened!

 

Interesting to note that no issues were found with the operators or their working practices. (p21, pa. 48) It was 2 different engineers that weren't aware/told of the 5th train being added to the system and it was one of these that cleared the block, clearing this block is what allowed the full train to be sent under "evacuation mode", supposedly to get the riders off safely and get all the trains back into the station. (p5, pa. 10 - p7, pa. 15) He states that the ride and control system itself were robustly designed with an emphasis of "failing to safety". (p. 18, pa. 41) He wasn't happy with the training of engineers, with a lot of it being observational with little to no formal training.(p22, pa. 52)

 

He lists the errors that lead to the crash from page 25, paragraph 54. It seems 2 engineers weren't told about the 5th train, they didn't check the log book (because there was no official procedure to compel them to), so they were unaware of the 5th train. Having seen 3 trains in the station/brakes and the 4th train at the top of the lift, the engineer was satisfied he knew where all 4 trains were and cleared the block without checking the track because he felt there was no need because he had already accounted for all the trains he was aware of. Not to mention that he was under financial pressure to get the ride back open as quick as possible, with bonuses offered for minimal downtime and clocks in the op cabin to keep track of up/downtime.

 

All in all, a bit of a clusterf*ck.

Edited September 27, 2016 by Dar

[coasterbill]

2 different engineers that weren't aware/told of the 5th train being added to the system and it was one of these that cleared the block

 

That's honestly almost unthinkable. How is that even possible?

[Dar]

2 different engineers that weren't aware/told of the 5th train being added to the system and it was one of these that cleared the block

 

That's honestly almost unthinkable. How is that even possible?

 

Lack of communication, not checking logbooks, and rushing to get it back open

[Henry M]

I always thought it would be partly due to a rush to get the ride back open.

[jonskinny12]

Giving bonuses for ride uptime is one of the more ridiculous things I've heard of at a park, and it's not surprising that it led to the engineers being pressured to giving the ride the green light.

 

Does any other park do this? I'll admit, I've never asked anybody if they do because it just seems like such a bad idea.

[djrappa]

To me it shows massive flaws in the rides control system and I'm surprised that this was not detailed more in the findings.

 

Why was the first alarm when the car with guests attempted to leave the lift and enter the block with the stalled car?

There should have been a "block occupied too long" fault when the empty car failed to leave the block.

This would have been much more of a red flag for the engineers than the fault they received.

 

Other manufacturers have these faults built into their systems.

 

I also think a multi car ride like Smiler should have provisions in the control system for being aware of the current number of active cars. Then it would not allow the ride to run if it did not see at least 5 occupied blocks. Regardless of human intervention in auto or evac mode.

 

I'm not aware of any coasters (except maybe Disney who do their own controls) that do have awareness of number of cars running. They are simply programmed to accommodate any number using their block logic.